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PRINCIPLES OF U.S. FAMILY LAW
Vivian Hamilton*
What explains U.S. family law? To answer this question, this Article
undertakes a conceptual analysis of the legal practices that govern
families. This analysis has yet to be done, and its absence hamstrings
constructive thought on our family law. The Article develops a typology
that conceptualizes U.S. family law and exposes its underlying
principles: First, it identifies the significant elements, or rules, of f amily
law. Second, it demonstrates that these rules reflect or embody four
important concepts – conjugality, privacy (familial as well as
individual), contract, and parens patriae. Finally, it shows that the
concepts of family law in turn embody two distinct underlying principles
– Biblical naturalism and liberal individualism. From these powerful
principles, we can derive modern U.S. family law: they explain what our
family law is.
With this deepened understanding of its structure, the Article next
evaluates family law as the expression of it principles. It concludes that
each principle is individually flawed; and, taken together, they are too
often in unproductive tension. They thus doom U.S. family law to
incoherence and must be revised.
At a minimum, this Article seeks to launch a much-needed debate in
family law on whether our current foundational principles are desirable,
or even defensible. More ambitiously, the Article aims to ground a new
jurisprudence of family law that better reflects the social goals and needs
of contemporary U.S. society.

INTRODUCTION
U.S. family law is chaotic. Federal, state, and administrative bodies
enact and apply constitutional, statutory, and judge-made laws. Together
these laws regulate families and family life, but it is a struggle to find
thematic connection between one doctrine and the next. The chaos that
results is apparent not just to those who practice law or ponder it in the
academy, but to any layperson who reads the newspaper. Marriage
promotion programs coexist with statutory schemes that promise speedy
and painless divorces;1 same-sex couples and their families receive public
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See infra notes 19, 35-36, and 61, and accompanying text.
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benefits and protections in many cases, while the Defense of Marriage
Act, state constitutional amendments, and the proposed Federal Marriage
Amendment all seek to withdraw or, at the least, keep them to a
minimum;2 and parents’ rights (especially those of married parents) can
receive greater consideration than the best interests of their children.3 The
list goes on.
But is there a deeper coherence that unifies diverse family laws? And
if so, what is it?
The Article examines those questions and reaches two conclusions:
First, there is an imperfect coherence to family law as it now exists, as two
principles – Biblical naturalism and liberal individualism – link together
and explain its central concepts. Second, each principle is individually
flawed; and, taken together, they are too often in unproductive tension.
They thus doom U.S. family law to incoherence.
Biblical naturalism embraces a pre-modern notion of natural law
molded by Biblical scripture and Judeo-Christian doctrine.4 It dictates a
normative view of the “moral family”. Liberal individualism emphasizes
the atomistic individual and safeguards freedom in a secular and pluralistic
society. And from these powerful principles, we can derive modern U.S.
family law: they explain what our family law is.
This Article launches the development of a new normative
jurisprudence of the laws regulating families. The necessary first step of
this larger project is a conceptual analysis of the legal practices that
govern families. The analysis resides at the intersection of positive and
normative analysis, and it seeks to lay bare the ideological assumptions
embodied in our institutional practices. To do this, the Article applies a
pragmatic methodology that eschews top-down deductive analysis, which
would proffer philosophical principles that ought to serve as foundation of
and justification for a legal system or institutional structure. Analysis
instead begins closer to the metaphorical middle, identifying those
principles that currently do serve as foundation of and justification for our
actual family law system.5
2

See infra note 129, and accompanying text.
See infra notes 53-55, and accompanying text.
4
See infra notes 69, and accompanying text. “Biblical naturalism” is a term
adopted for the sake of convenience, economy, and clarity. It should be noted
that it is unrelated to the works of Brian Leiter, who imports the term
“naturalism” into legal theory to refer to the general belief that philosophical
inquiry should refer to and depend upon empirical study. See, e.g., Brian Leiter,
Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 267 (1997).
5
H.L.A. Hart employed this process of criticism in books that explored
various jurisprudential issues. See generally, H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW (adjudication); H.L.A. HART AND A.M. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW
(fault); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (criminal law). The
methodology was refined by legal philosopher Jules Coleman. See JULES
3
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Identifying family law’s foundational principles is critical. It exposes
the underlying structure of family law and “deepens our understanding of
its structure by displaying the coherence and mutual support of its
component elements.”6 And it is only once the structure is clear that we
can begin to evaluate family law, including its underlying principles,
intelligently.7 This conceptual analysis of family law has yet to be done,
and its absence hamstrings constructive thought on our family law.
The typology developed here to conceptualize U.S. family law and
expose its principles is new: First, it identifies the significant elements, or
practices, of family law.8 Next, it examines those elements to reveal the
concepts they embody. It then examines the concepts and concludes that,
along with its practices, they in turn embody the twin principles of
Biblical naturalism and liberal individualism. Family law’s practices and
concepts thus effectuate and concretely express its principles.9
Scads of laws touch families in some way. Part I begins with a brief
discussion of the corpus juris of family law. It comprises those rules that
intentionally or directly (as opposed to incidentally) affect family
relationships. This Part then argues that these rules reflect or embody four
important concepts: conjugality (of the heterosexual sort), privacy
(familial as well as individual), contract, and parens patriae.10

COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST
APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY xiv, 5-6 (2001). This Article looks primarily to
Coleman’s refinement for methodological guidance.
6
COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 23.
7
Coleman argues for uncovering a legal system’s actual foundational
principles:
[This places us] in a position to ask . . . how attractive the principles
themselves are. The key point is that the moral or justificatory questions
are not prior to the explanatory ones, but can grow out of the explanatory
project as it reveals the abstract principles in greater specificity and
concreteness.

COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 6.
8
There is no effort, however, to exhaustively chronicle U.S. family law. A
number of academics have ably and comprehensively described modern family
law, and to do so here would not advance this project. See, e.g., SANFORD N.
KATZ, FAMILY LAW IN AMERICA (2003); HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (2d. ed. 1988). Instead, this
Article outlines family law’s most salient features — those that give it its shape
— thereby rendering it susceptible to analysis.
9
COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 6.
10
Literally, “father of the country”. Parens patriae power is the state’s
power to act to protect from harm or promote the welfare of individuals who lack
the capacity to act in their own best interests. See, e.g., Developments in the Law
– The Constitution and the Family (pt. 3), 93 HARV. L. REV. 1198, 1199 (1980).
For a discussion of its development as a doctrine, see Natalie Loder Clark,
Parens Patriae: History and Present Status of State Intervention into the ParentChild Relationship, in 1A CURRENT PERSPECTIVES IN PSYCHOLOGICAL, LEGAL
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Part II argues that the concepts of family law in turn embody two
distinct underlying principles — Biblical naturalism and liberal
individualism. It describes each and traces, both historically and
thematically, how they have shaped our family law. It identifies and
further describes the concepts that figure in each principle and explains
their interrelationships.
Part III concludes that liberal individualism and Biblical naturalism
each have their flaws, and together they are irreconcilable. The continued
accommodation of both in law leads to incoherence and thwarts the
achievement of important goals. As each pulls family law in a different
direction, lawmakers and members of an increasingly-divided populace
may cling to one or the other principle, warts and all — but not both. If
family laws are to generate outcomes that achieve some level of purposive
coherence – or at a minimum that do not undercut family law’s more
important goals – the continued incorporation of both principles must be
consciously and explicitly abandoned. In their place we must substitute
either a single unifying principle or an internally consistent set of
principles. Identifying the current principles of U.S. family law and
understanding their individual and in-tandem shortcomings will advance
that important project.
I. A TYPOLOGY OF U.S. FAMILY LAW: ITS CONCEPTS AND THE RULES
THAT EMBODY THEM
A. THE METHODOLOGY
This Part examines the primary elements or rules of U.S. family law
and argues that together they reflect its key concepts: conjugality,
privacy, contract, and parens patriae. To come at it another way, each of
these concepts warrants and is actualized by a range of inferences, and – if
the list of concepts is correct and complete – this range of inferences
corresponds with the important elements of our family law. For example,
one can infer from the concept of conjugality many of the key practical
elements of our marriage laws—a formalized relationship between an
opposite-sex couple that is presumptively enduring and through which sex
and procreation are legitimated. In this way, the rule or practice both
reveals the content of the concept and can be inferred from it.11
Part II will argue that these concepts taken together in turn reflect
general principles – Biblical naturalism and liberal individualism. These
AND ETHICAL ISSUES 109, 109-10 (Sandra Anderson Garcia & Robert Batey eds.,
1991).
11
See COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 7-10. The rules of family law provide
neither the concepts themselves nor the principles they embody with all of their
content. Other legal systems and a full range of social practices contribute to and
can be embodied in them as well. But the rules of family law certainly give the
concepts and principles some, if not much, of their content. See id. at 56-57.
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principles are embodied in the concepts and rules of U.S. family law and
simultaneously explain it – not its every aspect, but its core.12
Two notes on the structure of the rules/concepts/principles construct
are called for. First, the reader should note that the boundaries between
each category are not rigid; the categories are interconnected and must be
viewed holistically. Precise demarcation is not always possible. Nor is it
necessary – the goal of such a structure is to help illuminate the nature of a
legal system, and this construct accomplishes that.
Second, the metaphorical structure represents a continuum of
abstraction – from the law’s concrete practices to its theoretical
underpinnings.13 This Article does not attempt to describe all points on
that continuum, nor does it care to establish its endpoints. The rules
themselves, for instance, represent a level of abstraction and warrant their
own inferences (related to execution, actual effect on individuals, etc.).
And at the other extreme, principles may themselves embody other,
higher-level principles, and so on. The analysis focuses on this range
within the continuum for a simple, practical reason: any analysis or
explanation of a social institution should, of course, be useful; it should
illuminate the institution’s structure and reveal the coherence of its
component parts.14 Near one endpoint of the continuum, the rules of
family law provide evidence, though necessarily imperfect, of actual
practice. And from a purely practical perspective, they are vastly easier to
work with than is, say, actual sociological data. And near the other
endpoint, the principles of Biblical naturalism and liberal individualism
are the most useful, in this case, because they best explain our particular
legal order. An explanation of family law as an embodiment of some
ultimate principle would fall short of these goals. Ultimate principles
explain our need for some legal order.15 Societal goals of selfpreservation, for instance, inform the family laws of all countries; focusing
on that upper-level principle, however, tells us little about our family law.
On the other hand, the closer one moves toward the levels of legal
concepts and rules, the more difficult it is to see and discuss any
overarching coherence. As when viewing an impressionistic painting or a
3-D poster, one needs some distance to make sense of what on too-close
inspection appears to be a pointillist mess.
Let’s turn now to the system to be analyzed.
Family law, as conceived here, comprises those sets of laws (1) whose
purpose is to regulate relationships among intimates, or (2) whose

12

See COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 8.
See COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 55 n.1.
14
See COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 23.
15
See, e.g., WAYNE MORRISON, JURISPRUDENCE: FROM THE GREEKS TO
POST-MODERNISM 378-79 (1997) (discussing H.L.A. Hart’s thesis of the
minimum content of natural law).
13
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operation hinges on the existence of a certain family status or
relationship.16
Certain rules directly order family life and family relationships. These
include obvious examples like laws regulating marriage, divorce, and
parenting. Other rules – like those governing child custody and child
support – regulate intimate relationships or affect individuals based on
their relationships to others; these also belong in that category. Similarly,
various rules – those involving inheritance, tax, and insurance, to name a
few – link important benefits and obligations to legal family status.17 It
would be wrong to treat these kinds of laws as outside of family law or as
existing merely in the penumbra of the core family law. Indeed, a
legislature may more successfully influence family composition through
indirect means (e.g., by subsidizing via tax benefits certain family forms
but not others18) than by more direct legislation (e.g., by making divorce
difficult or impossible to obtain19).

16

This view of family law is consistent with the contemporary view of
family in the U.S. The concept of what constitutes family and family law has
evolved. Nancy Cott has noted that at common law, the concept of “domestic
relations” included “the relative privileges and duties of husbands and wives,
employers and employees, and masters and slaves.” NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC
VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 6-7 (2000). See, also,
PETER W. BARDAGLIO, RECONSTRUCTING THE HOUSEHOLD: FAMILIES, SEX,
AND THE LAW IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH 25 (1995) (“Central to the
world view of . . . slaveholders was a broad conception of family, one that went
beyond the nuclear unit to encompass nonnuclear kin, slaves, servants, and all
other inhabitants of the plantation”.). Contemporary treatises on family law more
narrowly focus on relationships between intimates. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note
8; and CLARK, supra note 8.
17
See infra notes 56-59, and accompanying text. At the risk of stating the
obvious, my placing certain laws or systems of laws within the “family law”
category does not imply that these laws belong exclusively within that category.
Laws may be considered “family law” while simultaneously falling into
categories of “tax law”, “employment law”, or others.
18
See, e.g., EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 11-28 (1997);
Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2000).
19
Historically, state legislative measures aimed at restricting divorce were
unable to thwart the growing demand for dissolution. See generally HENDRICK
HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (2000); Developments in the
Law – The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1996, 2087-91
(2003); Joanna L. Grossman, Separated Spouses, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1613 (2001);
Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before
No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REV. 1497 (2000); Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to
the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women’s Rights and Family Law in the
United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2017 (2000).
Legislative divorce was a practice adopted by states that allowed state
legislatures to issue divorces to couples on an ad hoc basis if, in the opinion of
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Thus defined, these varied family laws embody four underlying
concepts: conjugality, contract, privacy, and parens patriae. These
concepts organize family law.
B. EMBODYING CONJUGALITY AND CONTRACT: RULES OF MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE
1. Marriage and the Marital Family
Those rules of family law that formalize and shape the institution of
marriage embody the concepts of conjugality, contract, and privacy.
Conjugality is a legal status (marriage), but it is also a powerful
normative concept.20 The rules that both reflect and actualize the concept
of conjugality include those that: permit only opposite-sex couples to
marry;21 limit to two the number of people who may enter into a
marriage;22 require that marriages be presumptively enduring and
the legislature, the couple was deserving. Grossman, supra, at 1645. Until the
mid-nineteenth century, this was the only way that married couples could legally
divorce in most states. Id. at 1645. This practice gave way to judicial divorce
after most states enacted bans on divorce bills, as their legislatures were unable to
meet the demand for divorces. Id. Fault-based judicial divorce replaced
legislative divorce by the end of the 19th century. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A
Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REV.
1497 (2000). Courts granted divorces only to “innocent” spouses who could
persuasively demonstrate that the breakdown of the marriage was the fault of
their partners. Id. Through the late 19th and into the 20th century, the demand for
divorce grew, and some states responded by enacting more stringent divorce
laws. These measures, however, failed to reduce demand. Id. at 1502-03. Some
husbands and wives who both wished to divorce colluded to present (perjured)
evidence of fault; others traveled to states where divorce was easier to obtain. Id.
at 1503-04. Ultimately, states accepted that efforts to enforce couples’
commitments were doomed to fail. Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the
Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. REV. 79 (1991). With the single exception of
Arkansas, every state in the country has thus adopted some version of a no-fault
divorce regime, granting divorce upon a showing that the marriage is
irretrievably broken. Id. at 90.
20
See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of
the Family in American Law and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 387.
21
Massachusetts is (so-far) the singular exception.
Goodridge v.
Massachusetts held the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage
“incompatible with the [Massachusetts] constitutional principles of respect for
individual autonomy and equality under law." 798 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Mass.
2003). The First Circuit in Largess v. Massachusetts refused to enjoin the
implementation of Goodridge. 373 F.3d 219, 219-21 (1st Cir. 2004). Together,
Goodridge and Largess made Massachusetts the first state in the union to permit
same-sex marriages.
22
All states prohibit polygamy. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878) (affirming criminal conviction of Mormon man who participated in plural
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dissoluble only by the state;23 impose on married couples – viewed in
important respects as a single unit – mutual obligations of support;24 and
declare marriage to be the locus for legitimate sex and procreation.25
Rules governing entry into marriage have changed little since the
country’s founding and reflect not only the concept of conjugality, but also
marriage); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 849 (1988) (declining to extend constitutional right to privacy to protect
plural marriage).
23
Every state has implemented statutes requiring judicial approval and
declaration of divorce. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW, 204-08; 498-504 (1988).
24
For a discussion of the development of the notion of conjugal unity, see
infra notes 123-25, and accompanying text. Eight states, for example, retain
interspousal tort immunities, on the theory that a person can’t sue him- or herself.
See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 845-46
(2004). Through the doctrine of necessaries, retained by two-thirds of all states,
states require spouses to provide material support to each other. The doctrine
requires a spouse to pay debts incurred by the other for the purchase of
“necessary” items. See Id. at n. 34 (cataloging the states that retain the doctrine).
Other rules demonstrate the notion of conjugal unity by protecting spouses’
interests in each others’ bodies, companionship, and services. Tort doctrines, for
instance, permit a spouse to sue for loss of consortium when her partner has been
injured. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 491, 503-04 (2005) (discussing marital consortium doctrine and
cataloguing cases acknowledging doctrine). See also JoEllen Lind, Valuing
Relationships: The Role of Damages for Loss of Society, 35 N.M. L. REV. 301,
314-15 (2005) (discussing the history of the claim for loss of consortium) .
25
The Supreme Court’s decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
129 (1989), provides a striking example of the societal importance attributed to
the conjugal family. Here, the Court held that states may decide that any child
born to a married woman may be treated as a legal child of the marriage (so long
as husband and wife agree to this). Actual paternity is irrelevant. And the
biological father’s connection affords him no rights vis-à-vis the child. What
explains such a rule, where legal status creates a paternal fiction that can trump
actual biological connection? The answer is a view that stable marital families
are a critical social good, and thus preservation of the conjugal relationship and
family outweighs recognition of biological parentage.
The concept of
conjugality thus explains the rule.
States have historically promoted conjugality not only by directly supporting
that relationship but also by prohibiting intimate sex acts outside of marriage.
Such prohibitions have all but disappeared, as courts have extended privacy
protections to such acts. Yet some states retain laws (despite a near-certain
inability to constitutionally enforce them, in light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)) that prohibit consensual
sodomy, fornication, or adultery. See Singson v. Virginia, 621 S.E.2d 682 (Va.
Ct. App 2005) (stating that Lawrence did not declare all sodomy statutes facially
unconstitutional). See also, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403(1) (2003).
After Lawrence, the constitutional validity of any such prohibition is highly
doubtful. See 539 U.S. 558, 578.
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that of contract. 26 Embodying aspects of contract, rules require that
marriages be entered voluntarily and consent freely given; marriages
entered under duress or coercion, or otherwise absent true consent, are
void.27
Once married, however, laws convert a couple’s private relationship to
a state-regulated legal status. That status is much more alterable than it
once was, but even today, those of its terms considered essential to that
status are unalterable. Couples usually may not alter by contract the rules
that govern their ongoing marriages.28 Courts refuse to enforce, for
instance, agreements providing that one spouse will compensate the other
for domestic services.29 Their reasoning is that mutual entitlement to
support and domestic services is an essential aspect of the conjugal
status.30
Another basic, unalterable aspect of conjugality is its presumed
lifelong status. Couples cannot pre-establish the duration of their
marriages – once entered, a marriage presumptively continues until the
death of either spouse. Nor may couples unilaterally dissolve their legal
marriages; only the state by divorce decree may do so. Together with the
essentially unalterable nature of the intact marital relationship itself, these
examples demonstrate the continued primacy of the concept of conjugality
in family law.31 The rules of divorce have softened some of the more

26

The essentials of marriage have long included both mutual consent and
capacity. See WALTER C. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PERSONS AND
DOMESTIC RELATIONS, ROGER W. COOLEY, ED. 6 (3d ed. 1921) [hereinafter
TIFFANY’S DOMESTIC RELATIONS]. To have the “capacity” to marry, couples
could face no impediment of relationship (consanguinity or other prohibited
degrees of kinship), incapacity for sexual intercourse, preexisting marriage, or
“civil conditions”—i.e., race. Id. at 25-36. Tiffany notes that “in many states,
marriages between negroes, Indians, or Chinese, and white persons, are
prohibited.” Id. at 30. Of these “essentials”, only the requirement that the couple
not violate certain racial criteria has been eliminated. See Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
27
Consent must be given absent fraud, duress, mistake, or incapacity.
Insanity, intoxication, or nonage could render a party incapable of giving true
consent. TIFFANY’S DOMESTIC RELATIONS at 7-25. See also Elizabeth S. Scott
& Robert E. Scott, Marriage as a Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225,
1257 (1998).
28
See Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, supra note 24, at 836-41.
29
Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, supra note 24, at 840-41, n. 38
(cataloguing state court decisions).
30
Id.
31
See Eric A. Posner, Family Law and Social Norms, in THE FALL AND RISE
OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 256 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999). Posner argues:
[W]e are far from a system in which parties are free to contract for any
marital arrangement that they want . . . [P]otential mates cannot bind
themselves legally to marriages in which spouses’ domestic, financial, and
sharing obligations are specified by contract. Polygamous and same-sex

9

PRINCIPLES OF U.S. FAMILY LAW

constraining aspects of conjugality, but they have not altered its essential
form. We turn next to those elements of family law.
2. Divorce
Unlike laws governing entry into marriage, laws governing divorce
have changed radically since the country’s founding.32 Early laws
enforced lifelong conjugality. In the colonies and the early days of the
country, the marital relationship was virtually indissoluble.33 States
gradually permitted judicial divorce, but only to an innocent party who
could prove the “fault” of his or her spouse—through adultery, violence,
cruelty, incurable insanity, etc.34 Not until the latter part of the twentieth
century did states begin permitting couples to divorce based essentially
upon a showing that they were no longer compatible.35 These changes in
the rules and practices of family law relaxed one of the more stringent
(and least successful36) requirements of conjugality and simultaneously
expanded some individuals’ abilities to determine their intimate lives.
But even in the current “no-fault” era, conjugality perseveres. Divorce
is not automatic, nor is it always easy. Many states in fact permit
relatively quick and easy divorce only if both parties consent to the
dissolution of the marriage. When one spouse opposes dissolution, family
law rules require courts to put on the brakes and more deeply inquire into
the couple’s relationship. Usually, the petitioning spouse may then prove
irreparable deterioration of the marriage relationship by showing that the
couple has lived separate and apart (without engaging in sexual relations)
for a statutorily prescribed period of time.37 In some states, a couple must

marriages are prohibited. These laws are . . . restrictions on freedom of
marital contract, and they strikingly distinguish family law from contract
law.”

Id. Hasday has also argued that to claim that the family law has moved from
status to individual ordering through contract overstates changes that have
occurred. Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, supra note 24, at 834-48. Most
commentators emphasize the radical changes and “contractualization” of family
law. See, e.g., Jana Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV.
1443 (1992); Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of
American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985).
32
See Shaakirrah R. Sanders, The Cyclical Nature of Divorce in the Western
Legal Tradition, 50 LOY. L. REV. 407 (2004) (tracking the evolution of Western
divorce law).
33
See supra note 19, and accompanying text.
34
See id.
35
See id.
36
See id.
37
More than half of all state divorce statutes impose “separate-and-apart”
requirements. Doris Jonas Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty
States: An Overview, 21 FAM. L.Q. 417, 442 tbl.1 (1988).
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be separated for at least two years before a court will grant a divorce over
the objection of one of the parties.38
Even when they allow marital bonds to be severed, states’ laws have
historically treated marital obligations of support (usually a husband’s
duty to support his wife) as enduring.39 Alimony or spousal support has
since become less favored (and officially gender-neutral).40 Its goals have
also evolved from ensuring ongoing support to include “rehabilitating” a
spouse who has been unemployed or underemployed during the marriage
in order to facilitate her reentry into the workforce, thus ensuring
economic self-sufficiency;41 and reimbursing a spouse who has
contributed (usually services) to the marriage “partnership”.42 Parties
generally have the freedom, moreover, to privately order through contract
some of the important consequences of marital dissolution.43
Family law rules that permit couples to enter agreements establishing
the financial consequences of dissolution actualize the concept of contract.
States (with varying degrees of skepticism) generally recognize and
enforce premarital agreements that set the financial terms of dissolution.44
Some of the legal rules affecting marriage and divorce reflect the
concept of contract, and many of the developments in these family law
rules aim to further equality and individual self-determination. But

38

Ten states and Puerto Rico impose a two-year minimum separate-and-apart
requirement. Freed & Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States, supra note 37, at
442 tbl.1.
39
Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 75, 122 (2004).
40
See Lee. E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 WIS. L.
REV. 1135, 1162 (1985).
41
Michelle Murray, Alimony as an Equalizing Force in Divorce, 11 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 314 (1997).
42
Murray, supra note 41, at 313.
43
The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, adopted by half of the states,
authorizes couples to determine by contract the financial consequences of the
marriage’s dissolution. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT (1983). But
aspects of those agreements that purport to resolve nonfinancial issues such as
custody of children or conduct during the marriage are typically not binding.
See, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 7.08 (2002).
44
See Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, supra note 24,
at 507 (noting that prenuptial agreements were not favored by early common law,
but modern state courts generally recognize and even encourage the use of these
agreements); Karen Servidea, Reviewing Premarital Agreements to Protect the
State’s Interest in Marriage, 91 VA. L. REV. 535, 536-40 (2005) (tracking the
historical development of premarital agreements, and state courts’ increasing
willingness to enforce them); Developments in the Law – The Law of Marriage
and Family, supra note 19, at 2075-98 (outlining developments in the
enforcement of prenuptial agreements).
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conjugality’s essential aspects (as legal status and normative concept)
remain, and remain largely unchanged.
We turn now to the laws of parenting and child welfare.
C. EMBODYING CONJUGALITY, PRIVACY AND PARENS PATRIAE: RULES OF
PARENTING AND CHILD WELFARE
The concept of privacy restrains the state’s ability to interfere in the
family. Its counterpoise, parens patriae, empowers the state to interfere
when necessary to protect families’ more vulnerable members.45 Along
with conjugality, these concepts are embodied in the various rules
governing parenting and child welfare.
Long before the Supreme Court explicitly named it a constitutionallyprotected individual right, states implicitly recognized and respected the
concept of family privacy.46 The concept of family privacy historically
recognized paternal authority over and obligations towards both wives and
children.47 Today, that concept shapes family law rules that largely permit
parents to raise their children as they see fit, generally free from state
interference. Parents share significant authority—a constitutionallyprotected fundamental “right”—over their children.48
The concept of family privacy is in tension with the concept of parens
patriae. Family laws have expanded the state’s powers to protect
children.49 But the expansion of the influence of parens patriae on rules
of parenting and child welfare does not necessarily demonstrate a
weakening of respect for parents’ rights and family privacy; but instead,
both (1) an increased recognition of children as full persons, themselves
entitled to individual rights; and (2) the state’s own interest in its future
citizenry.
Indeed, parens patriae has not come close to superseding the concept
of family privacy, especially that of the conjugal family.50 The state
intervenes in the “intact” family in limited situations51 – namely, when it
perceives a serious threat to the physical or mental health of the child, and
even then, not in all cases.52

45

See supra note 10.
See infra notes 131-132, and accompanying text.
47
See infra notes 154-159, and accompanying text.
48
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982).
49
See infra notes 172-176, and accompanying text.
50
See supra note 25, and accompanying text.
51
CLARK, supra note 8, at § 9.4.
52
See, e.g, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (“[So long as a parent
adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no
reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family”); Marjorie
Frieman, Unequal and Inadequate Protection Under the Law: State Child Abuse
Statutes, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243 (1982). The state has struggled with cases
46
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The “best interests of the child” standard expresses the state’s parens
patriae role and has been widely adopted by state legislatures to guide
judges making custodial and other decisions related to children. But this
standard is not intended to ensure that parents generally act in the “best
interests” of their children. Instead, parents are presumed to act in their
children’s best interests.53 When marriages or nonmarital households in
which children are being raised fail, parties sometimes turn to the judicial
system to resolve child custody disputes. But judges make a small
percentage of custody determinations; generally, parents agree to a postdissolution custodial arrangement. 54
Once in the courts, respect for family privacy and parental rights can
clash with, and indeed supersede, children’s interests and the state’s
parens patriae power. Even after a child has bonded with a non-parent
caretaker (in the event a parent has been found neglectful or has
temporarily surrendered custody of her child to another), for instance, the
parent seeking to regain custody will almost always have a superior claim
to custody over his or her natural child. When courts decide such “parent
vs. third-party” claims, they generally may not order a custodial
arrangement they consider to be in a child’s best interests acontextually;
the parent benefits from the proverbial thumb on the scale.55
The concepts of family privacy and conjugality are expressed by rules
that respect the notion of parents’ “rights” over their children. But
parents’ rights are by no means absolute; increased recognition of children

where parents refuse medical care for a seriously ill or disabled child because of
their assessment that treatment will be futile. A federal statute characterizes
medical non-treatment as a form of child abuse. Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act (CAPTA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5105 (1999), and Child Abuse
Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 5106(g) (1994). However, CAPTA requires
states to include spiritual treatment exemptions to protect those parents whose
refusal to consent to medical treatment for a child is based on religious beliefs.
Id. But subsequent regulations promulgated pursuant to CAPTA by the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare excluded the spiritual treatment
exemption. See Elizabeth A. Lingle, Treating Children by Faith: Colliding
Constitutional Issues, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 301, 307 (1996). For a discussion
focusing on children’s rights, see James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon:
Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare and Education Laws, as Denials of Equal
Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1321 (1996).
53
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (“[T]here is a presumption that fit
parents act in the best interests of their children.”).
54
Courts generally respect parental decision-making and approve child
custody arrangements reached by parents; and in 80 to 90 percent of cases,
parents do reach agreement. See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H.
MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY
134 (1992).
55
See Developments in the Law – The Law of Marriage and Family, supra
note 19, at 2053-54.
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as individuals in their own right, needing and deserving protection, helps
explain the state’s parens patriae interventions in the private family.
D. EMBODYING ALL OF THE ABOVE: RULES THAT DEPEND ON FAMILY
STATUS
Laws whose operation hinges on family status embody the same
concepts identified and discussed above, but in particular conjugality.
Employment and insurance laws, tax laws, probate and inheritance laws,
evidentiary rules, and aspects of tort law condition legal rights and
financial benefits on the legal status of familial relationships. 56 Married
couples receive myriad public protections and benefits, including social
security insurance, employment and retirement benefits, inheritance and
estate benefits, and entitlements under federal immigration law, to name
but a few.57 Most of these laws support the conjugal relationship and
family; the exceptions are generally, at worst, neutral with respect to
family form.58 Social Security, for instance, ensures the financial security
of a non-wage-earning spouse or former should her partner become
incapacitated or die.59 A non-wage- earning single parent, however, must

56

See 42 U.S.C. §402(a)-(e) (providing derivative Social Security insurance
benefits to the spouse, ex-spouse, or widow of an insured worker); Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(regulating private employee benefit plans and allocating rights according to
family status); 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2) (2000) (exempting from numerical
limitations on immigration individuals according to family status). See also,
Report to the Honorable Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, “The Defense of Marriage Act,” Jan. 31, 1997, Federal
Document Clearing House, General Accounting Office, GAO/OCG 97-16
(reporting that more than 1,000 places in federal law alone link rights or benefits
to marriage). See also Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993) (listing the
many benefits provided exclusively to the marital couple, including: state
income tax advantages, public economic assistance (including Social Security
benefits), property rights, child custody awards, dower payments, inheritance
rights, the right to spousal support, and the automatic right to change one’s
name).
57
Id.
58
One sometime – and unintentional – exception is the so-called “marriage
penalty”, where some dual-income marital families pay higher federal taxes than
if they were to file singly. Some commentators argue that the federal tax
structure benefits the marital family with a single- or primary-wage-earning
spouse. See, e.g., EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 11-28 (1997);
Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2000); Marjorie Kornhauser, Love, Money
and IRS: Family, Income-Sharing and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 63, 64 (1993).
59
See supra note 56, and accompanying text.
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rely on need-based public programs that provide subsistence-level
assistance.60 Such programs emphasize self-sufficiency, but increasingly
are including incentives for poor families to conform to conjugal norms.61
Myriad laws more incidentally affect families but don’t belong in the
category of family law. Compulsory education laws, for example,
constrain parents’ freedom to educate or not educate their children in the
manner in which they see fit. Mandatory immunization laws similarly
deprive parents of some control over their children. The purpose of such
laws, however, is not to affect families or family life; nor does their
operation depend upon family status.62 In both examples, interference
with parental authority is necessary but incidental. In short, while most
laws affecting children interfere in some way with parental authority, they
ought not all be considered family law as such.
The legal rules, or elements, of U.S. family law thus embody
underlying concepts of conjugality, privacy, contract, and parens patriae.
The next Part argues that these concepts in turn embody underlying ideals,
or principles.
II. PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW
“[I]n certain kinds of practices, the inferential roles of concepts may be
seen to hang together in a way that reflects a general principle. The
principle can then be said to be embodied in the practice and, at the same
time, to explain it.”63

The concepts of U.S. family law discussed above embody two
foundational principles: Biblical naturalism and liberal individualism.64

60

See Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal History of the
Bifurcated Law of Parental Relations, 90 GEO. L.J. 299 (2002).
61
See Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2003,
H.R. 4, 108th Cong. §103(b) (providing $100 million/year to states for “healthy
marriage promotion activities”).
62
The goals of compulsory education, for instance, include helping secure
the future liberty of the individual child and ensuring the future well-being of
both the child and of society generally. To that end, public education is provided
by the state directly and without cost to all U.S. children. Similarly, mandatory
immunization laws reflect public health concerns.
63
COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 8.
64
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22 (1977). Dworkin uses
the term “principle” to refer to “a standard that is to be observed . . . because it is
a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality.” Id. A
principle states or embodies a social goal or political value. See also, BRIAN BIX,
JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 87 (3d ed. 2004) (defining principles
as “moral propositions that are stated in or implied by past official acts.”).
Principles inform legislative and judicial pronouncement of rules. See
DWORKIN, supra, at 22. “They seem most energetically at work, carrying most
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The following Sections examine first the development of the principles,
and then the mechanics and character of their influence on U.S. family
law.
A. BIBLICAL NATURALISM AND ITS INFLUENCE ON U.S. FAMILY LAW
“[W]hen the Supreme Being formed the universe, and created matter out
of nothing, he impressed certain principles upon that matter, from which
it can never depart . . .”65

That the Judeo-Christian tradition has helped shape U.S. family law is
quite beyond dispute.66 Law and religion scholar John Witte, Jr. reminds
us that “[t]he laws born of the Catholic and Protestant models of marriage
are not the artifacts of an ancient culture . . . Until the twentieth century,
this was our law in much of the West, notably in England and America.”67
There are two, more disputable issues: The first involves identifying
the contours of this tradition through its inferential role in the concepts and
practices of U.S. family law.68 This Article argues that family law’s
concepts and practices combine in a way that reflects a pre-modern69 view
weight, in difficult lawsuits . . . [In these difficult cases,] principles play an
essential part in arguments supporting judgments about particular legal rights and
obligations. After the case is decided, we may say that the case stands for a
particular rule. . . But the rule does not exist before the case is decided; the court
cites principles as its justification for adopting and applying a new rule.”
65
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
VOL. I (1807). Blackstone refers here to the creation story of Genesis.
66
Its influence, however, has received surprisingly little scholarly attention
from the legal academy. Allusions to the Christian derivation of U.S. family
practice are not uncommon, but few legal commentators have systematically
explored the connection. One exception is John Witte, Jr., who has traced the
influence of Christian theological traditions on the development of Western legal
principles. JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE,
RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION (1997). Witte focuses on the
various different Christian theologies (Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, and
Anglican) and their effect primarily on Western Europe, but also on the United
States. See also, FRANCES GIES AND JOSEPH GIES, MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY
IN THE MIDDLE AGES 36-42 (1987) (discussing the historical impact of
Christianity on family life generally). See generally, Andrew H. Friedman,
Same-Sex Marriage and the Right to Privacy: Abandoning Scriptural,
Canonical, and Natural Law Based Definitions of Marriage, 35 HOW. L.J. 173
(1992).
67
See WITTE, supra note 66, at 12. See also, MARY ANN GLENDON, STATE,
LAW, AND FAMILY: FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION IN THE UNITED STATES AND
WESTERN EUROPE (1977).
68
See COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 8.
69
Significant differences exist between medieval (or pre-modern) and
modern theories of natural law. Pre-modern theories argued the existence of a
universal law derived from God, and the existence of objective moral principles
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of natural law filtered through Judeo-Christian theology—Biblical
naturalism. The second issue is the extent to which this tradition
continues to animate our law. The conventional wisdom is that the
progress of U.S. family law has been a steady march “from status to
contract” or from public to private ordering.70 This Article counters that
Biblical naturalism retains a powerful grasp on our family law even – or
perhaps especially – today.
The next three Sections trace the development of the key ideas that
make up Biblical naturalism71 and describe its specific influences on
family law. They argue that this principle has not only remained a strong
undercurrent in U.S. family law, but also that it is enjoying a period of
renewed prominence and influence in public discourse. The first and
second Sections highlight significant aspects of the Jewish and Christian
family traditions, respectively. The third Section discusses pre-modern
natural law theories that predominated in the early U.S. and which
incorporated key elements of the Judeo-Christian tradition, helping shape
first English, then U.S. family law.
1. The Jewish Tradition
The Hebrew Covenant, recorded between the latter half of the ninth
and early part of the eighth centuries B.C., set down laws that had been in
effect for as many as three hundred years prior.72 While Jewish society
was in many respects similar to other societies of the time,73 Hebrew law
is notable in that its more than 600 commandments purportedly come

dictated by nature and discoverable by reason. See LLOYD WEINREB, NATURAL
LAW AND JUSTICE 53 (1987). The Renaissance saw the beginning of the
secularization of natural law. Id. at 108-10. In the 18th century, Hume
developed a modern, secular theory of natural law. See D. FORBES, HUME’S
PHILOSOPHICAL POLITICS (1975).
70
See supra note 31, and accompanying text.
71
For more exhaustive treatment of the history of the Church and family, see
generally, THEODORE MACKIN, MARRIAGE IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH:
DIVORCE AND REMARRIAGE (1984).
72
Frank Alvarez-Pereyre and Florence Heymann, The Desire for
Transcendence: the Hebrew Family Model and Jewish Family Practices, in A
HISTORY OF THE FAMILY VOL. I: DISTANT WORLDS, ANCIENT WORLDS 155
(Andre Burguiére, et al., eds., Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1996). The
five Books of Moses (the Pentateuch) – the foundation of Hebrew law – are
complemented by the Talmud, a body of rabbinical writings which seeks to
define rules and laws even more precisely. Id. at 155, 158.
73
Jean-Jacques Glassner, From Sumer to Babylon: Families as Landowners
and Families as Rulers, in A HISTORY OF THE FAMILY VOL. I: DISTANT
WORLDS, ANCIENT WORLDS 104 (Andre Burguiére, et al., eds., Belknap Press of
Harvard Univ. Press 1996).
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directly from God.74 Its provisions have thus carried throughout history
the added weight of divine ordination. A description of these provisions
germane to family law follows.
Patriarchy. One of Jewish law’s most important provisions concerned
male leadership of the family. In the Old Testament, God enters into a
Covenant with Abraham alone, excluding his wife Sarah and giving
“divine sanction to the leadership of the patriarch over his family and
tribe.”75 The patriarch exercised authority over his wife and children, and
the practice of agnatic descent ensured the continuation of that authority
through future generations.
Monogamy and polygyny. Jewish law favored monogamy but did not
forbid concubinage and polygyny.76
Thus while some Jewish
communities were monogamous, in others, polygyny endured well into the
Middle Ages. In some communities, demographic and economic
pressures limited its practice (a man had to be wealthy to obtain and
maintain numerous wives); in others local civil laws and custom
(including in Christian environments) squelched the practice.77
Entry into marriage. In order to effectuate a legal marriage, Hebrew
marriage law required payment by the man’s father to the future wife’s
father, and the transfer to the wife of a dowry by her father.78 The
couples’ consent was important, and the marriage became effective after
the couple had executed a contract (ketubah), cohabited, and
consummated their relationship.79
Procreation. The importance of marital procreation is highlighted
early in the Old Testament, where God directs man and woman to “be
fruitful and multiply.”80

74

MOSES MIELZINER, THE JEWISH LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN
ANCIENT AND MODERN TIMES, AND ITS RELATION TO THE LAW OF THE STATE
(Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1987) (1884) “The Bible contains laws as well as
ethical doctrines . . . [A]ll laws contained in these books of Moses are proclaimed
in the name of God, who is the source of all ethical truth . . .” Id. at 14.
75
GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY 190 (1986).
76
MIELZINER, supra note 74. Mielziner notes that the law “endured”
polygamy but did not sanction it. Parts of the Old Testament provide for
polygyny (21 Exodus 9; 18 Leviticus 18; 21 Deuteronomy 15-17), but other
provisions presume monogamy as the norm (20 Deuteronomy 7; 24:5; 25:5-11).
77
Alvarez-Pereyre & Heymann, supra note 72, at 182-84. (It should be
noted that “[b]y [Judaism’s] Roman period, monogamy seems to have been the
common practice.” THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE BIBLE 496 (Bruce M.
Metzger and Michael D. Coogan, eds., 1993).
78
22 Exodus 15-16; 22 Deuteronomy 28-29. Alvarez-Pereyre & Heymann,
supra note 72, at 175. With trivial exception, the consent of both parties was also
required. MIELZINER, supra note 74, at x.
79
Pereyre & Heymann, supra note 72, at 175-76.
80
1 Genesis 28.
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Ending marriage. A husband could unilaterally divorce his wife by
giving her a bill (a get) terminating their marriage and dismissing her.81
These key elements of Jewish family law were then absorbed, for the
most part, into the Christian tradition. The Christian family tradition,
however, differs in a number of important respects from that of the Jewish
tradition.82 The next Section touches on its more important elements and
notes several significant areas where the Christian family tradition
diverges from its Jewish roots.
2. The Christian Tradition
The early Christian church viewed marriage as “subject to the law of
nature, communicated in reason and conscience, and often confirmed in
the Bible.”83 Jesus and St. Paul both spoke at length about the marital
family, “and their teachings have been the cornerstone of the Western
tradition of marriage for nearly two millennia.”84 Beginning with their
formalization in the twelfth century, the church’s theology and laws of
marriage became widely communicated and profoundly influential.85 A
description of its primary family traditions follows.
Patriarchy/marital unity. The husband’s authority over the marital
household in the Jewish tradition gave way in the New Testament to a
more explicit description of the married couple as a unit, led by the
husband: Paul’s letters to the early Christian churches teach that husbands
and wives “shall become one flesh”, but that “the husband is the head of
the wife.”86 The Christian tradition thus retained the patriarchy of the
Jewish tradition but placed greater emphasis on unity.
Monogamy. The combination of monogamy and polygyny that had
existed in the Jewish tradition gave way to a full commitment to
monogamy in early Christianity.87 The primary purpose of monogamy
was not procreation, however, but chastity. The early Church sought to
control sexual desires and sexual conduct; some, including St. Augustine,

81

24 Deuteronomy 1. Pereyre & Heymann, The Desire for Transcendence:
the Hebrew Family Model and Jewish Family Practices, supra note 72, at 17879. This allowance for divorce ended sometime after the beginning of
Christianity. MIELZINER, supra note 74, at x.
82
GIES & GIES, supra note 66, at 37-40 (noting that, in comparing the Old
and New Testaments, theologian St. Augustine “found a number of recurring
tenets but not a completely harmonious consistency” and discussing key familyrelated distinctions).
83
WITTE, supra note 66, at 25.
84
Id. at 16.
85
GIES & GIES, supra note 66, at 37; WITTE, supra note 66, at 16.
86
5 Ephesians 23-32.
87
NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE
NATION 5-6 (2000).
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viewed sex as per se sinful.88 Celibacy, which encouraged a close
spiritual connection to the kingdom of God, was thought to be superior to
marriage.89 But monogamous marriage was still useful, according to one
early theologian, because it “sets a limit to desire by teaching us to keep
one wife [and] is the natural remedy to eliminate fornication.”90 God
created marriage “to make us chaste, and to make us parents.” 91 Marriage
was a “remedy” provided by God for otherwise-illicit lust.
Entry into marriage. Church teachings emphasized the importance of
mutual consent and voluntariness for marriage to be legitimate.
Procreation and sex.
The Old Testament made procreation
92
mandatory, but the New Testament merely paid it lip-service.93 St.
Augustine, already viewing the world as old and in decline, observed in
the fifth century that “there is not the need for procreation that there once
was.”94
Nonetheless, during the Reformation, procreation eclipsed libidocontrol as the primary goal of marriage. Marital procreation was a good,
although it remained a lesser good than celibate spirituality and
contemplation. Marriage’s secondary goal, however, continued to be the
control of sinful lust. Marriage rendered sex, not good, but licit. But it
perpetuated the species and expanded the Church. The Church thus came
to prohibit contraception, abortion, and infanticide.95
The Church sought to closely control sex generally. St. Paul’s letters
contain litanies of prohibited sexual sins, which included lust,
homosexuality, sodomy, prostitution, polygamy, and excessive
primping.96
Ending marriage. Another significant difference between the early
Jewish and Christian traditions concerned the end of marriage. As noted
above, a Jewish husband could divorce his wife, on his terms.97 This
became impossible in the Christian tradition, with a single exception – a
man could divorce a wife who had herself fornicated or committed

88

WITTE, supra note 66, at 21.
One early Church thinker, on a scale of values, rated virginity at 100,
widowhood at 60, and marriage at 30.
DAVID HERLIHY, MEDIEVAL
HOUSEHOLDS 22 (1985); GIES & GIES, supra note 66, at 39.
90
WITTE, supra note 66, at 20 (quoting John Chrysostom, Sermon on
Marriage, in ST. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM ON MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE 85 (St.
Vladimir’s Press 1986). See also 1 Corinthians 7.
91
WITTE, supra note 66, at 24.
92
1 Genesis 28.
93
GIES & GIES, supra note 66, at 37.
94
ST. AUGUSTINE, TREATISES ON MARRIAGE AND OTHER SUBJECTS 21-22
(Charles T. Wilcox, et al., trans., New York 1955).
95
WITTE, supra note 66, at 25.
96
Id. at 18.
97
See supra note 81, and accompanying text.
89
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adultery.98 Otherwise, only through annulment of a marriage, which
required a finding that a valid marriage never existed, could a person leave
a spouse and remarry another.99 Jesus himself emphasizes the enduring
nature of the marital commitment with the words, “what God has joined
together, no man must separate.”100 And emphasizing the break from the
Jewish tradition, he continued that “[f]or your hardness of heart, Moses
allowed you to divorce your wives, but from the beginning it was not so . .
. [W]hoever divorces his wife . . . and marries another commits
adultery.”101
Medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas offered both sacramental and
naturalistic justifications for the indissolubility of marriage. First, he
argued that marriage is a sacrament through which a couple becomes part
of the perpetual union of Christ and the Church.102 Their union, moreover,
mirrors that union. Thus marriage must similarly be an indissoluble
union. Second, Aquinas argued that nature intended marriage to be
“oriented to the nurture of offspring . . . [S]ince offspring are the good of
both husband and wife together, the latter’s union must remain
permanently, according to the dictate of the law of nature.”103
Later canon law permitted both husbands and wives to seek legal
separation (divorce from bed and board, or a mensa et thoro), but
continued to prohibit complete divorce.104 Church courts granted legal
separations in cases of adultery, desertion, or cruelty.105
3. The Natural Law Tradition
English family law’s historical and ideological origins can be traced
directly to natural law principles, as “revealed” by Biblical teaching,
including, of course, the Biblical teaching described in the previous two
Sections. Natural law theories, as conceived from the Medieval period
through the Reformation,106 essentially asserted the existence of objective
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19 Matthew 9; GIES & GIES, supra note 66, at 38.
Note that Judaism after Christianity evolved such that its views divorce
and practice with regard to monogamy came to closely match those of
Christianity. See Pereyre & Heymann, supra note 72, at 178-79. MIELZINER,
supra note 74, at x.
100
19 Matthew 6-9.
101
19 Matthew 6-9.
102
THEODORE MACKIN, MARRIAGE IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH: DIVORCE
AND REMARRIAGE 342 (1984) (discussing Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the
Sentences).
103
Id. (quoting Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences).
104
WITTE, supra note 66, at 36.
105
WITTE, supra note 66, at 65.
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One may trace natural law positions, of course, to the classical Greek and
Roman writers, including the Stoics, Plato, and Cicero. See BRIAN BIX,
JURISPRUDENCE, THEORY AND CONTENT 66-67 (3d ed. 2004). Important aspects
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moral principles imposed by a divine creator and (more or less)
discoverable by reason.107 In his seminal COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND, William Blackstone finds in natural law principles
coherence in the disparate judicial opinions that constituted English
common law.108 Blackstone is important, not because he was an
especially innovative legal theorist – he wasn’t – but because so many
early U.S. lawyers and lawmakers closely studied his writings.109 In the
Introduction to the COMMENTARIES, Blackstone links the core principles
of English common law to divinely-inspired Biblical scripture. Under this
view, God has set down certain immutable laws of nature, which may be
discovered by humans and must not be contravened.110 Human faculties
of reason (imperfect ever since Adam’s transgression in the Garden of
Eden) are alone not up to the task of uncovering these truths. But “Divine
Providence”, through the holy scriptures, has intervened and revealed
God’s law.111
Early American lawmakers struggled to accommodate both their
religious convictions, which mandated certain family practices, and their
commitment to establishing a country that respected religious liberty.
Principles of natural law helped them mediate these tensions by allowing
them to incorporate their religious beliefs into law under theism, detached
from any single denomination or theology.
4. Its Influence on U.S. Family Law
a. The Mechanics
The Christian religion ascended and triumphed throughout Europe by
the fourth century, with the Roman Catholic Church becoming history’s
first great religious organization.112 The Church’s efforts to bring broader
marital behavior under ecclesiastical administration and the canon law
took centuries.113 Having accomplished this, the Church then had to
of the theory change, however, with the early Church writers. Id. It is their
conception of natural law that most directly influenced the Western tradition and
U.S. law.
107
M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD’S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 90-110
th
(7 ed., 2001).
108
BLACKSTONE, supra note 65.
109
As one commentator has noted, “All of our formative documents – the
Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Federalist Papers, and the
seminal decisions of the Supreme Court under John Marshall – were drafted by
attorneys steeped in Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of
England.’” ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE
11 (1984).
110
See supra note 65.
111
Id.
112
GIES & GIES, supra note 66, at 36-37.
113
COTT, supra note 87, at 5.

22

PRINCIPLES OF U.S. FAMILY LAW

grapple for a few more centuries with English and Continental monarchs.
Reformers protested the Church’s jurisdiction over marriage and its
enforcement of canon law.
In the sixteenth century, monarchs
successfully wrested from the Catholic Church this control,114 and
Protestant theology helped justify the adoption of civil (as opposed to
purely religious) marriage statutes.115 The Protestant reformations
differed somewhat theologically, but they all emphasized the importance
of marriage to civil society, and the propriety of state and community
involvement.116
At the same time, however, the monarchies – the English being the
most relevant for our purposes – got exactly what they wrested, a Biblical
Naturalist understanding of marriage and family law. The reformers
accepted and incorporated much of the traditional canon law; that law
remained part of the common law of both Protestant and Catholic Europe
into the late-eighteenth centuries.117 As a result, English marriage laws in
the sixteenth century did not differ significantly from those of the
medieval Catholic tradition.118
Seventeenth-century English theologians proffered the commonwealth
model of marriage and the family to defend then-existing laws. This
model “helped to substantiate the traditional hierarchies of husband over
wife, parent over child, church over household, [and] state over
church”.119
British colonists brought to America with them then-prevailing British
laws,120 and we thus find the roots of U.S. family law in early modern
England.121 The English common law passed to and was largely accepted
by early American civil authorities. The congruence between citizens’
and the government’s views on marriage reinforced the influence of the
Bible on this elemental part of early American family law:
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Id. at 5.
WITTE, supra note 66, at 42-43.
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WITTE, supra note 66, at 44-45.
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Id. at 44.
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Id. at 131.
119
Id. at 131.
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JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIED
WOMEN UNDER THE STATUTES OF THE SEVERAL STATES AND AT COMMON LAW
AND IN EQUITY, VOL. I [hereinafter BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
MARRIED WOMEN I], 1 (1873, reprint ed. 1987). See also, JOEL PRENTISS
BISHOP, BISHOP ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, WITH THE EVIDENCE, PRACTICE,
PLEADINGS, AND FORMS; ALSO OF SEPARATIONS WITHOUT DIVORCE, AND OF
THE EVIDENCE OF MARRIAGE IN ALL ISSUES, VOL. I [hereinafter BISHOP ON
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE I], 36 (5th ed., 1873).
121
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIED WOMEN, supra note
65, at 1. Bishop observed that “the law of married women came originally to us
from England with the general mass.” Id.
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The Christian religious background of marriage was
unquestionably present and prominent. It was adopted in and
filtered through legislation. For Americans who envisioned
marriage as a religious ceremony and commitment, the institution
was no less politically formed and freighted; yet they were unlikely
to object to secular oversight when both the national and the state
governments aligned marriage policies with Christian tenets.122
b. The Concept of Conjugality
Biblical naturalism thus shaped early Western concepts of family law,
including that of conjugality. And the conjugal concept found its most
significant expression in early U.S. family laws implementing the
Biblically-derived unity of husband and wife123 Early family law rules –
like the New Testament—declared the marital couple a single unit, headed
by the husband. That unity took legal form in the doctrine of coverture, in
which the wife’s legal personhood became subsumed into her
husband’s.124 Wives ceased to exist as separate legal entities and were
unable to execute legal documents or own assets without their husbands’
cooperation.125
Other aspects of Biblical tradition that were present in early American
law included the importance of free consent for the creation of a valid
marriage, and the (theoretically) indissolubility of marriage. While the
latter reinforced the importance of conjugality, the former foreshadowed
the increasing importance of the concept of contract in family law.
In many important respects, aspects of the principle of Biblical
naturalism and the concept of conjugality both continue to be embodied in
and effectuated by U.S. family laws. Its rules define and carefully
circumscribe membership in marriage and the marital family; establish
unalterable terms governing the intact marriage, viewing the conjugal
couple in many respects as a single unit;126 presume marriages to be
enduring; and require state declaration for legal dissolution. And state
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COTT, supra note 87, at 9.
Id. at 10.
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See NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE,
AND PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 158-59 (1982); COTT,
supra note 87, at 10-12.
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COTT, supra note 87, at 11-12. When a man and woman married,
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[T]he common law turned the married pair legally into one person—the
husband . . . This legal doctrine of marital unity was called coverture . . .
Coverture in its strictest sense meant that a wife could not use legal avenues
such as suits or contracts, own assets, or execute legal documents without
her husband’s collaboration . . . And the husband became the political as
well as the legal representative of his wife, disenfranchising her.

Id.
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See supra note 24.
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restrictions on consensual non-marital and extra-marital sexual activities
persist, despite the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lawrence v.
Texas.127
The continued vitality of the concept of conjugality is evident,
moreover, in the widely perceived moral superiority of the marital family
as the “natural” and optimal family form. Recent events and policies
reflect these views. When it enacted the 1996 Welfare Act, for example,
the federal government explicitly identified marriage formation as one of
the goals of the statute.128 States are increasingly adopting such programs,
aimed both at their poor as well as their general populations. The Defense
of Marriage Act, the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment, and
proliferating state constitutional amendments restricting marriage to
opposite-sex couples all seek to all seek to reinforce traditional
conjugality.129 Because much opposition to homosexual marriage stems
from beliefs with origins in Biblical naturalism,130 these notable examples
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See supra note 25.
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-19 (2000).
129
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) ensures that same-sex couples
receive no federal spousal benefits by defining “spouse” and “marriage” to
include only the union of a man and woman. 28 U.S.C. § 1738(c) (Supp, 1998).
It also declares that the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause (ART. IV, §1)
does not require states to recognize same-sex marriages formalized in other
states. 28 U.S.C. § 1738(c). The Federal Marriage Amendment states:
“Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a
woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be
construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred
upon any union other than the union of a man and a woman.” H.R.J. Res. 39,
109th Cong. (2005). To date, thirty-eight states have statutes or constitutional
amendments restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples.
See
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/news/fact.html?record=1427
(last
visited Mar. 3, 2006) (listing states with statutory or constitutional provisions).
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See, e.g., John J. Coughlin, Natural Law, Marriage, and the Thought of
Karol Wojtyla, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1771, 1774 (2001):
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[T]he medieval canonists integrated various aspects of religious and secular
thought to create a natural law theory of marriage. The theory held that
marriage was a permanent association between a man and women intended
to nourish the bond of conjugal love and to enable the procreation and
education of children.

Id. See also, Andrew Koppelman, The Decline and Fall of the Case Against
Same-Sex Marriage, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 5 (2004); Michael J. Perry,
Christians, the Bible and Same-Sex Unions: An Argument for Political SelfRestraint 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 449 (2001).
But see, WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY
TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 99-100 (1996) (noting that “[t]here is no univocal
Judeo-Christian tradition against same-sex marriage” and presenting alternate
interpretations of religious texts commonly cited as condemning homosexuality).

25

PRINCIPLES OF U.S. FAMILY LAW

may represent either lingering or renewed willingness to embrace legal
rules whose justifications lie almost exclusively within that tradition.
The concept of conjugality supports (and has itself been reinforced by)
another concept – that of familial privacy. Early U.S. law (and much of
contemporary U.S. law) viewed the conjugal couple as an impenetrable
and indivisible unit. The metaphor of unity, combined with the concept of
the male’s individual rights as head of that unit, shielded the family from
state interference. The next Section briefly examines family privacy’s
Biblical-natural roots.
c. The Concept of Privacy
Biblical naturalism also helped shape the concept of family privacy.
Post-colonial notions of patriarchal authority over the home justified state
noninterference in the family; such noninterference sought not to ensure
individual autonomy and self-effectuation, but instead to enable the family
to function as a distinct unit within society, under male authority. 131
Social practice obligated the male head of the family to run a well-ordered
household; legal rules empowered him to do so by granting him control
over its inhabitants, family property, and other resources.132 One
seventeenth-century author expressed the common authoritarian view of
parenting: “[C]hildren’s wills and willfulness [must] be restrained and
repressed . . . Children should not know, if it could be kept from them, that
they have a will of their own, but in their parent’s keeping.”133
(Notably, the concept of familial privacy was simultaneously
supported in the early U.S. by the principle of liberal individualism. The
next section discusses the nature of its influence, and how liberalindividual ideas on this topic were adjusted to better correspond with
Biblical-natural ideals. It will also trace how the expansion of that
principle shifted notions of privacy from the family to the individual.)
Biblical naturalism and the concepts that embody it have thus exerted
great influence over the shape of family law as it existed in the early
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Early Americans viewed the family as the unit entitled to privacy and
freedom from state intervention. Larry Peterman & Tiffany Jones, Defending
Family Privacy, 5 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 71, 74-76 (2003). Peterman and Jones
note that the early concept of familial privacy protected the family unit “so that
members of the family could fulfill the responsibilities inhering in their particular
roles.” Id.
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MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 5, 236-38 (1985). Into
the nineteenth century, fathers had exclusive and extensive rights over wives and
their children, who were subordinate to and dependent on them. See also supra
notes 124-25, and accompanying text (discussing doctrine of coverture); note 24,
and accompanying text (discussing other doctrines).
133
Teitelbaum, supra note 40, at 1139 (quoting J. ROBINSON, OF CHILDREN
AND THEIR EDUCATION (1628) (additional citations omitted)).
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states. Early lawmakers shared the near-universal belief in a theistically
ordained natural order, distinctly shaped by the Biblical tradition. In many
ways, however, its directives conflicted with those of a second principle to
which the early U.S. was also committed – liberal individualism. The
ideal of liberal individualism, how it clashed with early Americans’
Biblical naturalistic beliefs, and the effects of these on our family law are
the focus of the following Section.
B. LIBERAL INDIVIDUALISM AND ITS INFLUENCE ON U.S. FAMILY LAW
As it is with Biblical naturalism, that the principle of liberal
individualism has helped shape U.S. family law is clear.134 Ideals of
individual liberty were written into the country’s founding documents and
are part of our cultural discourse.135 This Article argues that this is the
second foundational principle of U.S. family law – like Biblical
naturalism, it has heavily influenced the original shape and later
development. Its ideals have moved U.S. family law along two axes: the
first has extended guarantees of liberty to greater numbers and classes of
individuals, including women and children; the second has increased the
total quantum of liberty permitted each individual. Changes in laws have
sought to expand individual autonomy and facilitate self-determination,
frequently at the expense of Biblical-natural ideals.
The next two sections describe the principle of liberal individualism
and demonstrate its influence on concepts and practices of U.S. family
law.
1. Liberal Individualism
The liberal theories articulated by John Locke significantly influenced
American statesmen of the late eighteenth century,136 and his ideas have
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See Singer, supra note 31, at 1508-1517 (1992) (noting the importance on
U.S. political and legal thought of individual autonomy and notions of privacy,
but arguing that until recently, these concepts have been ascribed to the family
unit, rather than the individual). See generally, ROBERT BELLAH, ET AL., HABITS
OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985).
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See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1-2 (U.S. 1776); U.S.
CONST. pmbl. See also infra note 138 and accompanying text.
136
E.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE AND MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE
CONSTITUTION 70-71 (1991) (“[O]ne of the most influential thinkers for
American statesmen of the [late eighteenth century was] the seventeenth-century
English political philosopher John Locke.”); Steven Kautz, Liberty, Justice, and
the Rule of Law, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 435, 438, n.7. (1999) (“Classical
liberalism is the view that liberty is the fundamental political good. The
authoritative statement of this view is JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT); Jeremy Waldron, Natural Rights in the Seventeenth and
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been considered “the touchstone of all subsequent liberal thought.”137
Locke’s theory of liberal democracy espouses radical individualism138 and
a concomitant theory of the negative, limited state.139 Thomas Paine’s
Eighteenth Centuries, in NONSENSE UPON STILTS: BENTHAM, BURKE AND
MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN (Jeremy Waldron, ed., 1987) 7-25 (“[T]he
argument set out in [Locke’s] Two Treatises of Government will serve us, as it
served the revolutionaries of the eighteenth century, as the paradigm of a theory
of natural rights.”); Bruce Kuklick, Seven Thinkers and How They Grew:
Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz; Locke, Berkeley, Hume; Kant, in PHILOSOPHY IN
HISTORY 130 (Richard Rorty, et al., eds., 1984) (“[I]n the United States, [Locke]
was the intellectual father of the Constitution. He was ‘America’s philosopher’,
‘the great and celebrated Mr. Locke’, whose claim on American affections dated
from the Revolution.”).
137
BRIAN R. NELSON, WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT: FROM SOCRATES TO
THE AGE OF IDEOLOGY 208 (2d ed. 1996). Other liberal thinkers who influenced
early Americans included Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and
Immanuel Kant. Id. Mary Ann Glendon points especially to Thomas Hobbes,
especially as his ideas were expressed by the influential American jurist Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN
WESTERN LAW 119-25 (1987). Hobbes’s writings influenced Locke; however,
Locke’s conception of the natural state as one of liberty triumphed over the
Hobbesian view of the state of nature as a state of war. See NELSON, supra, at
233-34.
138
In his Second Treatise, Locke writes that “[m]an being born . . . with a
title to perfect freedom and an uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and
privileges of the law of Nature, equally with any other man . . . have by nature a
power . . . to preserve his property—that is, his life, liberty, and estate, against
the injuries and attempts of other men”. JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of
Government, IN TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT Bk. II, cap. 7 (Peter Laslett,
ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1965) (1689)).
139
NELSON, supra note 137, at 193-95. Locke emphasized the primacy of
individual rights and liberties, and viewed the function of government to be
limited to safeguarding those liberties from intrusion. He writes that
A man, . . . having, in the state of Nature, no arbitrary power over the life,
liberty, or possession of another, but only so much as the law of Nature
gave him for the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind, this is all
he doth, or can give up to the commonwealth, and by it to the legislative
power, so that the legislative can have no more than this . . . It is a power
that hath no other end but preservation”.

LOCKE, supra note 138, at cap. 11.
There has been some debate as to whether the dominant political tradition in
the fledgling U.S. was republicanism or the classical liberalism perhaps best
articulated by John Locke. See Mark V. Tushnet, Book Review, A Conservative
Defense of Liberal Constitutional Law, 100 HARV. L. REV. 423, 425 (1986)
(reviewing ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1985)). The traditions differ in their conceptions of individual liberty: in
the republican ideal, liberty is the absence of domination; in the Lockean ideal,
liberty is the absence of interference. See PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A
THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 41 (1997). In the republican view,
“[T]he kindly master does deprive subjects of their freedom, dominating them
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Common Sense, a highly influential 1776 pamphlet that stated the case for
American independence, echoes Locke’s theory of limited government as
one charged with the protection of certain fundamental rights; these
included life, liberty, and property.140 Other statesmen, including
Alexander Hamilton and James Otis, explicitly refer in their writings to
the importance of Locke’s theories.141 While many early Americans
undoubtedly learned only second-hand Lockean liberal ideals (dissociated,
perhaps, even from his name), those ideals nonetheless predominated. As
one political theorist argues:
The American Revolution was carried out, if only indirectly, in the
name of Lockean ideals. The Declaration of Independence . .
without actually interfering. The well-ordered law does not deprive subjects of
their freedom, interfering with those subjects but not dominating them.” Id.
There appears to be general consensus, however, that Lockean liberal
individualism prevailed as the dominant political philosophy, and the notion of
freedom as non-interference superceded the notion of freedom as nondomination. See id., at 41. Pettit argues that the republican ideal was gradually
replaced by the liberal, non-interference ideal. Id. at 12, 35-50.
Until the latter half of the twentieth century, historians accepted that the
“American political tradition was unequivocally Lockean.” Id. (citing as the
classic articulation of this view the discussion in L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL
TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955)). Other historians have argued that, at least
during the period leading up to the framing of the Constitution (and perhaps for
some time thereafter), the predominant political philosophy was republican. See,
e.g., G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST (1981); GORDON S.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787 (1969). This
view, however, has not gained universal acceptance. See, e.g., J. DIGGINS, THE
LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1984).
140
THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE: ON THE ORIGIN AND DESIGN OF
GOVERNMENT IN GENERAL, WITH CONCISE REMARKS ON THE ENGLISH
CONSTITUTION (1776) (“Society is produced by our wants, and government by
our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness positively by uniting our
affections, the latter negatively by restraining our vices . . . Government, even in
its best state, is but a necessary evil”.), reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
FREEDOM: IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 171-79 (Samuel B.
Rudolph, ed. 1993). See also, J.S. MCLELLAND, A HISTORY OF WESTERN
POLITICAL THOUGHT (1996); THE PHILOSOPHY OF FREEDOM, supra at 87.
McLelland notes that:
According to the testimony of contemporaries, Paine’s pamphlet had a
remarkable effect on the minds of Americans in the year 1776 when even
the most rebellious Americans were still wavering about the crucial step of
declaring independence. George Washington himself is supposed to have
been finally converted to independence by reading Paine.

Id.
141

Alexander Hamilton, Response to “Farmer”, in THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, VOL. 1 (Harold C. Syrett and Jacob E. Cooke, eds,
Columbia University Press 1961); James Otis, Of the Natural Rights of Colonists,
reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF FREEDOM: IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 129-31 (Samuel B. Rudolph, ed. 1993).
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.speaks the language of natural rights . . . Locke’s economic and
social theories have by now become an American ideology. His
emphasis upon the importance of . . . individual rights has been
profoundly influential in this country.”142

Also profoundly influential in the eighteenth century was the principle
of Biblical naturalism. It too shaped political thought and legal practice,
and early Americans sought to reconcile the two principles and
accommodate both in law. Locke himself provides a striking example.
Locke hewed to a view of natural law that grounded his theory of
rights and equality.143 And the ideas expounded in his Two Treatises are,
according to commentator John Dunn, “saturated with Christian
assumptions”.144 Locke took the general subordination of women as
evidence of its natural ordination. As did many early Americans, he
viewed entry into marriage as properly governed by the liberal concept of
contract, describing it as a “voluntary Compact between Man and
Woman”.145 Locke nonetheless did not extend his notion of equality to
women within marriages, reasoning that when husband and wife disagree,
it becomes “necessary, that the last Determination, i.e., the Rule, should be
placed somewhere, [and] it naturally falls to the Man’s share, as the abler
and the stronger.”146
Thus Locke, who convincingly argued for the safeguarding of
individual liberty, was at the same time strongly constrained and deeply
conflicted by Biblical tenets that reinforced the moral rectitude of the
“natural” patriarchal family. After attempting in vain to reconcile Locke’s
position on women’s subjection with his theories of basic human liberty
and equality, Jeremy Waldron concludes:
Locke’s position on the natural subjection of wives is an embarrassment
for his general theory of equality . . . Bible and nature are cited for the
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NELSON, supra note 137, at 212.
LOCKE, supra note 138, at 311. “The State of Nature has a Law of Nature
to govern it, which obliges every one: and Reason, which is that Law, teaches all
Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one
ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions.” Id. His was
a view widely held by Americans. See, e.g, THE PHILOSOPHY OF FREEDOM:
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 84-85 (Samuel B. Rudolph, ed.
1993) (“The early Americans talked a good deal about what we would today
refer to as natural law . . . The laws of God and nature [ ] afford an equality of
liberty for all”.).
144
JOHN DUNN, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN LOCKE: AN HISTORICAL
ACCOUNT OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 99
(1969). Dunn writes that “Jesus Christ (and Saint Paul) may not appear in person
in the text of the Two Treatises but their presence can hardly be missed when we
come upon the normative creaturely equality of all men in virtue of their shared
species-membership.” Id.
145
LOCKE, supra note 138, at 82.
146
Id.
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proposition that women are men’s inferiors; and Bible and nature are
cited for the proposition that women and men are one another’s equals . .
. [H]ere is a philosopher struggling not altogether successfully to free his
own thought as well as the thought of his contemporaries from the idea
that something as striking as the difference between the sexes must count
in itself as a refutation of basic equality”.147

The difficulties of accommodating in public policy both the ideal of
liberal individualism and Biblical natural views of family were evident in
early political debates. Delegates to the 1853 Massachusetts constitutional
convention, for example, viewed as critical the need to safeguard
individual rights through democratic political representation.148 One
delegate noted that, “[I]n order to secure the rights of these families –
these units, including all the individuals in them . . . each family must be
represented.”149 But, he rationalized, the male head of household must be
that sole representative because the differences among the sexes was
natural and ordained by God.
This Article does not suggest that early American lawmakers were
intimately familiar with and/or influenced by all aspects of Lockean
thought. Nor does it minimize the likely influence of other political
theorists. Yet as a political philosophy, liberalism was foundational. Its
ideas informed early Americans’ thinking and writings; the latter were
distributed and widely read. The tension between ideals of liberty and
equality and the realities of social inequalities was one with which Locke
himself grappled, largely unsuccessfully. Over the next two centuries,
many of the changes in U.S. family laws sought to more closely align
social practice with liberal ideals.
The next section turns to the influence of liberal individualism on U.S.
family law and practice.
2. Its Influence on U.S. Family Law
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JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY:
CHRISTIAN
FOUNDATIONS OF JOHN LOCKE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT 40 (2002) [emphasis in
original] (discussing the Two Treatises and JOHN LOCKE, THE REASONABLENESS
OF CHRISTIANITY, AS DELIVERED IN THE SCRIPTURES (Bristol: Thoemmes Press,
1997).
148
Jacob Katz Cogan, Note, The Look Within: Property, Capacity, and
Suffrage in Nineteenth-Century America, 107 YALE L.J. 473, 485 (1997), citing 1
Official Report of the Debates and Proceedings in the State Convention,
Assembled May 4, 1853, To Revise and Amend the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts 747 (Boston, White & Potter 1853)
[hereinafter Massachusetts Convention of 1853] (statement of Abijah Marvin).
149
Id., at 485, citing Massachusetts Convention of 1853 at 747 (statement of
Abijah Marvin). Another delegate argued that a family could “have but one will;
and the man, who, by nature, is placed at the head of that government, is the only
authorized exponent of that will.” Massachusetts Convention of 1853 at 598
(statement of George Boutwell).
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The principle of liberal individualism has guided the direction of U.S.
family law. Many developments in family laws reflect its direct influence.
To give just a few examples, rules have: restored legal capacity and
citizenship to married women;150 eased restrictions on divorce;151 and
relaxed legal constraints on sexual and intimate conduct generally.152
Liberal ideals have also expanded society’s willingness to view children,
not exclusively or even primarily as subordinate to parental authority, but
as individuals in their own right.153
Liberal individualism is also embodied in the following concepts:
freedom from state interference, or privacy; freedom to enter into
contracts; and, through the concept of parens patriae, the freedom (usually
of children) from harm imposed by others. The next Sections detail the
manner in which these important concepts in our family law embody the
liberal individual principle.
a. The Concept of Privacy
The principles of Biblical naturalism and liberal individualism together
gave shape to and were reflected in the early concept of familial privacy.
Biblical naturalism grounded the concept in patriarchal norms, and these
were embodied in rules that reinforced paternal authority.154 But liberal
individualism also figured in the concept. And in liberal rhetoric, family
privacy protected from undue state interference the individual rights of the
husband/father as the head and public representative of his family.155
Early law uneasily reconciled ideals of liberty and equality with the
social reality of inequality by identifying white, male property-owners as
those individuals uniquely entitled to full citizenship and its attendant
rights.156 A man’s liberty included control over his property and
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See supra note 124, and accompanying text.
See supra note 24, and accompanying text.
152
See supra note 25, and accompanying text.
153
See Michael D.A. Freeman, Taking Children’s Rights More Seriously, in
CHILDREN, RIGHTS AND THE LAW 52-71 (Alston, et al., eds. 1992).
154
See supra notes 131-33, and accompanying text.
155
See supra notes 143-49, and accompanying text.
156
A married man became the political and legal representative of his wife,
and assumed her property – “[h]e became the one full citizen in the household,
his authority over and responsibility for his dependents contributing to his
citizenship capacity.” COTT, supra note 87, at 11-12 (2000). See also, CHILTON
WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY, 17601860 (1960); MARCHETTE CHUTE, THE FIRST LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE
RIGHT TO VOTE IN AMERICA, 1619-1850 (1969); NELSON, supra note 137, at
193-95. Nelson notes that Locke considered women “citizens” who were
nonetheless excluded from full citizenship on the basis of paternal/patriarchal
power (which he rejected as a legitimate form of political authority). According
151
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household.157 The state respected that liberty and hence accorded the
family privacy, intervening only minimally. The tradition of state noninterference in the family gave a man near-absolute control over his home
and the individuals in it – it was his own “little commonwealth.”158 This
carefully-circumscribed conception of liberal individualism helped secure
men’s individual rights while simultaneously respecting Biblical-natural
norms dictating paternal authority over the family.159
Society’s stated liberal ideals were plainly inconsistent with the
legal incapacities and social inequalities of certain classes of people,
including women and enslaved people. Gradually, other individuals
within the household – women, children, and slaves gained full (or nearfull) formal legal personhood, entitling them to share the rights previously
enjoyed only by certain men.160 Women gradually gained formal equality
and marriage officially became a relationship between equals.161 The
presence in the household of additional full citizens thus weakened the
concept of male-headed familial privacy, but by no means did it eradicate
altogether the concept of family privacy.162
to Nelson, “[t]his was possible only on the assumption that the patriarchal family
is natural, that it existed even in the state of nature, and that as a consequence
women never possessed that property in either person or possessions that would
have made them equal participants with men in the act of contracting.” Id. at
215.
157
The husband’s control over the marital property was absolute, and his
authority over both his wife and children were extensive. See generally KATZ,
supra note 8; GROSSBERG, supra note 132, at 5.
158
See JOHN DEMOS, A LITTLE COMMONWEALTH: FAMILY LIFE IN
PLYMOUTH COLONY, p. x. (1970); GROSSBERG, supra note 132, at 4-5.
159
Teitelbaum, supra note 40, at 1174-79 (explaining that the law’s emphasis
on family privacy and autonomy reinforced male authority over the family). See
also, KATZ, supra note 8, at 131, citing Sanford N. Katz & William A.
Schroeder, Disobeying a Father’s Voice: A Comment on Commonwealth v.
Brasher, 57 MASS. L.Q. 43 (1973).
160
Within family law, the enactment of Married Women’s Property Acts
restored to married women their legal personalities. See BASCH, supra note 87.
Other significant rights became incorporated in Amendments to the Constitution.
For example, women gained the absolute right to vote in 1920. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIX. The Fourteenth Amendment more broadly guarantees liberty and
equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
161
Ann Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1830
(1995).
162
Id. at 1826-36. Dailey notes that “[t]he expansion of individual rights
within the domestic sphere, however, has not entirely eradicated the rhetoric of
family privacy from legal discourse. The doctrine of family privacy . . .
continues to control the state’s ability to intervene in the parent-child
relationship”. Id. at 1830-31.
The privacy that once respected male authority, however, continued to exist,
and shielded from public view domestic violence and subordination of physically
and economically weaker wives, as well as physical abuse of children. Thus
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Family privacy – modified by gains in gender equality – remains
especially robust in the area of parent-child relationships.163 Notions of
privacy that earlier limited the state’s interference with a man’s absolute
authority over his wife, children, and household became officially genderneutral. Men no longer have formal power over their wives, but parents
continue to have power over their children – “paternal authority” has
become “parental authority”. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court in the early
twentieth century explicitly grounded in principles of individual liberty a
constitutionally-protected “parental right” in the care and control over
one’s child.164 Family privacy thus respects “the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control.”165
In the twentieth century, the concept of privacy that had earlier
protected the family shifted to protect the individual. In 1973, the
Supreme Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird extended the protections of privacy
– initially belonging to the marital family – to the individual.166 With this
decision, the Court severed the theoretical link of privacy from its Biblical
underpinnings and firmly anchored it exclusively in Constitutional ideals
of individual liberty. Privacy exists now as a fundamental right belonging
to individuals. The ideal of state noninterference in private decisions
(procreative decisions,167 intimate sexual acts, 168 etc.) has been grounded
in the Constitution’s Due Process Clauses, the 9th Amendment, and
penumbra of various other amendments to the Constitution. It is worth
noting, however, that the concept of privacy itself may be ceding ground

feminists have criticized the concept of privacy as one that has permitted the
continued isolation and domination of women in homes.
163
Lee Teitelbaum notes that “[t]he notion of family privacy or family
autonomy is [ ] invoked regularly in connection with parent-child relations.”
Teitelbaum, supra note 40, at 1146.
164
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923). DAVID J. HERRING, THE PUBLIC FAMILY: EXPLORING ITS
ROLE IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 139-58 (2003). “Parental rights” include the
presumptive right to the custody of the child; to decide the nature and duration of
their children’s education; to leave their children in the care of another person for
long periods of time and subsequently reclaim them; and to discipline the child,
including corporal punishment or emotional manipulation. Id. at 140.
165
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 534-35. Ann Dailey notes that the
Court has sought to justify parental rights (within a constitutional philosophy that
places great emphasis on individual autonomy) by pointing to the unique role of
parents in preparing their children for the responsibilities of citizenship. Dailey,
supra note 161, at 1832-33.
166
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
167
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
168
In Lawrence, the Court saw these laws as seeking to control, not merely a
specific act, but more broadly “a personal relationship that . . . is within the
liberty of persons to choose.” S. Ct. 2472, 2478 (2003).
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to the broader notion of liberty (with its more explicit Constitutional
grounding) as the justification for individual protections.169
b. The Concept of State as Parens Patriae
The principle of liberal individualism, counterintuitively perhaps, has
helped to expand notions of children’s distinct personhood and shape the
concept of parens patriae. It has been the impetus behind, and provides
justification for, extension of notions of full personhood to children as a
class. The past few decades have seen development in the area of
children’s individual rights, but children’s rights have in many respects
been viewed as secondary to parents’ rights.170
Critics of the parental rights doctrine have argued that it conflicts with
liberal ideals – creating or expanding parental rights necessarily restricts
the rights of children. They argue that a strong conception of parental
rights subjects children to the choices of another, subsumes their interests
within those of their parents, and fails to recognize that children’s and
parents’ interests can all-too-easily diverge.171 Parents’ rights include
their ability to make choices for their children (religion, education, etc.)
that can sharply limit their future abilities to choose their own life course.
To protect the individual rights of children, the state is increasingly
willing to use the doctrine of parens patriae to intervene in even the intact
family.172 Historically the state exercised its parens patriae power when
no guardian was available to a child.173 That power has gradually
expanded. In the nineteenth century, state legislatures began enacting
child abuse and neglect laws that authorized governmental intervention
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See Stenberg v. Carhart,, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000) citing Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (discussing a
woman’s liberty interests in choosing whether to bear a child).
170
See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text. See also, HERRING, supra
note 164, at 139-58, Freeman, Taking Children’s Rights More Seriously, supra
note 153, at 52-71.
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See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987); Dailey,
supra note 161, at 1831-33; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child:
Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995
(1992).
172
HERRING, supra note 164, at 159. Herring notes that, “[W]hile the
rhetoric of parental rights comes under attack because of its negative effects on
children and functioning family associations, the rhetoric of children’s rights
grows more robust . . . In essence, society has used the rhetoric of children’s
rights to justify government involvement in the family association.” Id. (citations
omitted).
173
See Natalie Loder Clark, Parens Patriae: History and Present Status of
State Intervention into the Parent-Child Relationship ,in 1A CURRENT
PERSPECTIVES IN PSYCHOLOGICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES 109, 119 at
109-10, 116 (Sandra Anderson Garcia & Robert Batey eds, 1991).
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into abusive parent-child relationships.174 And today, laws give states
even broader powers to protect children.175 States assert jurisdiction in the
name of children’s best interest in actions before separate juvenile courts,
as well as in custody and adoption actions (including, perhaps most
notoriously, allegations of child abuse and neglect).176
The state’s interfering when necessary to safeguard the liberty of some
(i.e., children) from harmful incursion by others (e.g., parents or
guardians), is arguably the very embodiment of the Lockean ideals of
government.
c. The Concept of Contract
An essential aspect of liberty is the freedom to contract. Both liberal
individualism and Biblical naturalism supported the concept of conjugality
as a relationship entered into voluntarily.177 That women freely sought
and accepted the protection of a spouse gave early Americans some cover
for the internal inequalities of the marital relationship.178
The notion of indissoluble marriage clashed with liberal ideals.179
States drastically lowered barriers to divorce, in part reasoning that
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KATZ, supra note 8, at 131. See generally, SANFORD N. KATZ, MELBA
MCGRATH & RUTH-ARLENE W. HOWE, CHILD NEGLECT LAWS IN AMERICA
(American Bar Assn. Press, 1976).
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For a discussion of the current contours of the doctrine of parens patriae
in the U.S., see Natalie Loder Clark, Parens Patriae and a Modest Proposal for
the Twenty-First Century: Legal Philosophy and a New Look at Children’s
Welfare, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 381, 403-14 [hereinafter Clark, Parens Patriae
and a Modest Proposal].
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See Clark, Parens Patriae and a Modest Proposal, supra note 175, at 40314, n. 17.
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See Cogan, supra note 148, at 485. One nineteenth-century writer noted
that married women “conferred upon their husbands, by the marriage contract, all
their civil rights: not absolutely, . . . but on condition, that the husband will make
use of his power to promote their happiness”. Id., citing WILLIAM C. JARVIS,
THE REPUBLICAN; OR, A SERIES OF ESSAYS ON THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF
FREE STATES, HAVING A PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND THE INDIVIDUAL STATES 66 (Pittsfield, Phineas Allen 1820).
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See supra notes 145-46, and accompanying text.
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ARLAND THORNTON, READING HISTORY SIDEWAYS: THE FALLACY AND
ENDURING IMPACT OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL PARADIGM ON FAMILY LIFE 168
(2005). Thornton argues the incompatibility of enforced lifelong marriage with
Lockean liberal ideals:
That marriage was indissoluble had been a central [tenet] of the Catholic
Church from about 1200 on. With the Protestant Reformation came the
acceptance of divorce, but only in very limited sets of circumstances.
Marriage continued to be viewed legally, socially, and religiously as a
lifetime commitment. Clearly, Lockean principles were fundamentally at
odds with the notion of indissoluble marriage.
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voluntariness was an essential aspect of the marital “contract”. Initially,
divorce proceedings permitted courts to inquire into details of the failed
marriage; with the adoption of no-fault provisions in divorce statutes, the
necessity of such inquiries has been drastically curtailed. The state thus
continues to oversee dissolution of the marital bond. But the gradual
relaxing of divorce laws means that the formal strictures of the marital
status have ceded ground to individualism and the right to selfdetermination. The conjugal unit is sufficiently important that state
doesn’t want it severed lightly; but the countervailing principle of liberal
individualism also requires that state not stand in the way of its citizens’
desire for freedom and self-determination.
Couples have limited freedom to alter by contract some of the default
rules that govern the terms of their marriage, because strong conjugal
norms sharply circumscribe this ability.180 They have more freedom,
however, to alter by contract the financial consequences attendant to the
dissolution of their marriage.181 Even these contracts, however, are
frequently closely examined by courts to ensure that their enforcement
would not offend public policy.182
III. EVALUATING THE PRINCIPLES
“[A] commitment to the revisability of all beliefs is (if anything is) the
hallmark of the pragmatic attitude.”183

This Article tackles the first part of a larger project – development of a
normative jurisprudence of U.S. family law. This larger project comprises
three sequential parts: First, it requires a conceptual analysis of the social
and legal practices that govern families. Parts I and II have done this. The
goal of this type of analysis is to expose the structure of family law.
Understanding its structure helps us think more clearly about what U.S.
family law is, in order better to subject that is to analysis.184 Second, the
larger project requires critical or evaluative analysis of family law – a task
Id.
180

See supra notes 43-44, and accompanying text (discussing Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act and states’ treatment of premarital agreements
generally).
181
See id.
182
See, supra notes 43-45, and accompanying text. See also, e.g., WIS.
STAT. § 767.255(3) ([N]o such [premarital] agreement shall be binding where the
terms of the agreement are inequitable as to either party.”). See also, PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 7.08 (2002) (seeking to systematize
heightened judicial scrutiny of premarital agreements). The Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act treats premarital agreements more like commercial contracts,
although approximately one-third of the states have altered its terms to require
heightened scrutiny.
183
COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 8 [emphasis in original].
184
See COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 12.
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made more manageable through our deepened understanding of its
structure. This Part undertakes that task, examining family law’s most
significant rules as expressions of interrelated concepts and underlying
principles. The third and final part of the project will offer a normative
jurisprudence of U.S. family law that will better reflect contemporary
social values and whose outcomes will better meet contemporary social
needs. That difficult and important task must be the focus of future work.
This Article turns now to the focus of this part – evaluating family law
as the expression of its principles. This evaluation asks whether its
principles are satisfactory, or as reasonably satisfactory as can be
expected. This Article suggests one way to approach this difficult
question. If we cannot answer yes to it – and the next two sections
conclude that we cannot – then we must undertake the final step of
revising them.
To objectively evaluate the principles is, to say the least, difficult. By
shaping our family laws and social experience, the principles have
themselves affected, if not largely determined, many of our beliefs and
values about families. The challenge, then, is to avoid evaluating the
principles merely by reference to our moral sensibilities, as shaped by the
principles themselves. That would, of course, be a circular and pointless
exercise. To avoid that outcome, we can focus on the principles
exclusively as they figure in family law,185 yet allow our broader range of
understanding and experience enter into and inform our evaluation. That
broader experience, by incorporating a full range of principles (and
hierarchies of principles), helps ensure that we do not merely examine the
principles by reference to themselves or in an analytical vacuum.
Good or useful principles, this Article posits, would share at least the
following attributes: First, they would function well. In other words, their
expression in law and practice would further a set of social goals we
identify as useful and productive (e.g., provision of care for society’s
dependent members), while avoiding, as much as possible, outcomes that
we determine to be harmful and destructive (e.g., impoverishment of those
members). And second, they would work in concert with a full hierarchy
of principles from other legal and social contexts that, through our broader
social experience, we have come to embrace.
The next Section evaluates each principle separately, examining its
inherent attractiveness as well as its practical effect. The final one
evaluates them jointly, examining their combined effect on our family
laws.
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The principles figure in other aspects of U.S. law and practice; but their
desirability as underlying principles in other contexts does not concern us here.
Certain principles may properly be foundational in one context but inappropriate
in another. This Article thus examines their desirability as they apply to the law
of families.
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A. THE PRINCIPLES, INDIVIDUALLY
It is unsurprising that Biblical naturalism and liberal individualism
have become the dual foundations of U.S. family law. The conjugal
family form fulfills many opposite-sex couples, and at its best provides a
stable environment for procreation and childrearing. And most people
highly value their autonomy and the safeguards that permit selfdetermination. But a marriage dissolution rate that nears fifty percent and
steadily-increasing numbers of nonmarital families should convincingly
demonstrate that traditional lifelong conjugality cannot work for everyone
– or even, perhaps, for the majority of us. And while many of us enjoy
significant freedom from state interference, many others find themselves
without social connection or the social supports that would enable true
exercise and enjoyment of liberty. So what precisely is wrong with our
principles? Let’s turn first to Biblical naturalism.
From Biblical naturalism we derive concepts of conjugality and family
privacy. These concepts help define the normative family. The grounding
of the normative family in Biblical tradition lends divine sanction and
purported moral superiority to that family form, even today. And that
normative vision has in turn been expressed most significantly in our laws
of marriage and parenting. The principle is thus actualized by family laws
that provide societal support and reinforcement to that family form,
privileging it.186
So how do this principle and the laws that express it function? Again,
legal and social practice reinforce and privilege the marital family. That
family form aims to provide individual fulfillment (through shared love
and commitment) and the publicly-useful work of mutual support and
dependent caretaking. But privileging some families necessarily means
not privileging others. Thus nonmarital families – even those whose
members perform some of the same valuable societal functions (e.g.,
mutual support, dependent caretaking, and child-raising) as those
performed by the members of the marital nuclear family – receive less
public support.
Most would agree that (because of shared commitments to another
principle – the right to treatment as equals187) unequal treatment should
exist only with justification. In order to justify conjugal privileging, it
should be demonstrated that – at a minimum – the marital family performs
some useful societal function that other groupings fail to perform. This
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See supra notes 20 and 56, and accompanying text. For additional
discussions of the mechanisms through which marital nuclear families have
received public support throughout U.S. history, see STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE
WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP 68091 (1992); Martha Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family
Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2205-06 (1995).
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See DWORKIN, supra note _____ at 272-75.
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cannot easily be demonstrated. Indeed, while marriage may provide
individual fulfillment to some,188 the socially useful functions which it
performs – mutual support and dependent caretaking – can be and are
similarly performed (albeit currently with less social support) by other
family groupings.189 But the power of the conjugal norm is such that even
when empirical evidence shows that, in nonconforming relationships, care
between adult partners and success of childrearing virtually mirror that of
the traditional relationship,190 the nonconforming ones continue to be
viewed as less moral (at best).
An evaluation of the Biblical-natural principle should also examine
whether it (again, as expressed through practice) is consistent with the
other principle of family law, and the broader hierarchy of principles that
we espouse.
Biblical-natural concepts of conjugality and family privacy espouse
commitment and unity – laudable goals. But importantly, Biblical
naturalism irrevocably ties these values to a single family form – the
opposite-sex, formally married couple and their children (or at least, their
procreative potential). This is its fundamental flaw. It has led to rules in
U.S. family law that elevate family form over family function. The
reification of a single family form obscures consideration and support of
societal functions performed by nonconforming families.191 It provides
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In that personal fulfillment through entry into marriage is a good, it is
arguably an individual, private good. The sense in which marriage is
individually fulfilling and desirable (at least partly) due to the public approbation
and support it brings merely emphasizes the need to justify the exclusion of
nonconforming groupings from participation. For an elaboration of the argument
that marriage’s expressive, companionate, and procreative functions are private
goods best left to private ordering but that support and dependant caretaking are
public functions that should receive public support regardless of family form, see
generally, Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy, 11 VA. J.
SOC. POL’Y & L. 307 (2004).
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One result is the continued success of the marital family relative to
nonmarital families. Hence the Biblical- naturalistic compulsion is perpetuated,
and the continued relative success of the is helps justify and perpetuate the ought.
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See Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual
Orientation of Parents Matter?, 66 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 159 (2001).
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Indeed, society’s refusal to permit nonmarital families the same abilities
undermines their ability to perform socially useful functions. In many gay
families, only one member may legally adopt a child being raised by both. The
other member risks losing all rights to and authority over the child should the
couple’s relationship fail (a protection afforded both natural and adoptive
parents), and the child risks losing benefits derived from its relationship with the
non-adoptive parent. See, e.g., HERRING, supra note 164, at 156-57; Devjani
Mishra, The Road to Concord: Resolving the Conflict of Law Over Adoption by
Gays and Lesbians, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS 91 (1996).
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unsatisfactory justifications for withholding from those families public
benefits afforded the conjugal family.192
Lawmaking whose aim is to preserve or promote the conjugal family
thus fails to further the social goals of a changing and pluralistic society in
many ways. First, lifelong marriage will not be a reality for most families.
Second, encouraging couples to procreate to ensure the continued survival
or well-being of society is not the imperative it was in the days of the Old
Testament – to the contrary. And Biblical naturalism leads to some
socially harmful outcomes, as it results in the unequal treatment of
significant members of society.
Lawmaking in this tradition imposes conformity with a normative
family form with inadequate justification. To state the obvious, we are a
pluralistic society whose members do not all espouse the Judeo-Christian
tradition and the moral values it includes.
Indeed, the dominance of the majority will (manifested by social and
legal preferences for the Biblical-natural normative family) that grants
lesser liberty to a nonconforming minority represents just the sort of
conformity against which the principle of liberal individualism ultimately
rails. Let’s turn now to it.
On the positive side of the ledger, liberal individualism aims to
promote autonomy and resists majority efforts to impose conformity. The
principle has historically been invoked to increase the liberty of
individuals within the conjugal family. It has guided society’s increasing
respect of the liberty and equal treatment of both women and children.193
It is now being invoked by those who seek to increase the liberty of
individuals outside of the conjugal family (i.e., those families that don’t
conform to the traditional marital norm – including same-sex families) and
are thus denied its benefits.
But acceptance of liberal individualism as an ideal is neither universal
nor unequivocal. Theorists have critiqued its adoption a political goal. As
early as the nineteenth century, De Tocqueville argued that liberal
individualism emphasizes self-interest at the expense of community life.
The liberal individual “exists but in himself and for himself . . . [A]s for
the rest of his fellow citizens, he is close to them, but he sees them not”.194
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See generally, Hamilton, supra note 188.
See supra notes 160-62 (discussing expansion of women’s rights), 170-76
(discussing expansion of children’s rights) and accompanying text.
194
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE OLD REGIME AND THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION p. xiii. (Stuart Gilbert trans., Doubleday 1955). De Tocqueville
argued that liberal society required a large and powerful central government,
which was necessary to ensure maximum and equal liberty to all. The combined
effect of individualism and bureaucratic despotism was that “people are far too
much disposed to think exclusively of their own interests, to become self-seekers
practicing a narrow individualism and caring nothing for the public good. Id.
For de Tocqueville’s prescient critique of liberal democracy generally, see I
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Liberal individualism’s contemporary critics echo the theme. They argue
that its conceptions of autonomy and self-determination protected by legal
rights foster individual pursuit of self-interest, detached from
consideration for others. Indeed, the focus on individual rights elides civic
responsibility and destroys social cohesion.195
The flaws of liberal individualism as a founding principle of family
law become evident as one examines how, if operating alone, it would find
expression in family rules. Within families, dependency and codependency are virtually inevitable and can constrain individual
fulfillment. Imposing on individuals obligations towards others finds
scant support in a liberal-individual theory.196
Martha Fineman has further criticized as a fictional construct the
concept of the autonomous individual itself.197 Fineman points out that at
some point in life, every individual is dependent on others, and even
individuals who appear to be “autonomous” are in many ways supported
by others (e.g., the “autonomous” adult male whose market or public
activities are made possible by the at-home support of a woman and
family association).198 Fineman argues, the concept of the private
family—a unit entitled to both protection from the state and freedom from
state intervention—assumes away universal dependency. So while liberal
democratic society purports to rest on the autonomous individual, in fact it
is the family association that is its supporting unit.
In this case, family law’s principles do work in concert to achieve the
socially desirable goal of mutual support. But there are many examples
where the principles together effect, not coherence, but dissonance. The
next section illustrates this.
B. THE PRINCIPLES, WORKING TOGETHER

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 202 (Francis Bowen, ed.,
Phillips Bradley, trans, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1945).
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The existence in a field of law of principles in tension with each other
is not inherently objectionable.199 To the contrary, such tension can lead
to productive compromise. And sometimes, in the case of Biblical
naturalism and liberal individualism in family law, it does. For instance,
liberal ideals have operated to relax some of the more oppressive aspects
of the traditional conjugal relationship, expanding the liberties of women
and children and lowering barriers to individuals wishing to exit broken
relationships. It thus enables marriage (which originated as a patriarchal
and oppressive institution) to evolve and thus continue to exist and
perform socially useful support and child-raising functions.200 But in
other significant respects, the foundational principles that undergird our
family law are irreconcilable. Together, they too-often produce not
productive compromise but incoherence and discord. The most significant
examples follow, beginning with membership in the gravitational center
around which family law revolves – the marital, nuclear, family.
The previous section argued that Biblical naturalism ultimately
expresses an ideal that elevates family form over family function, unfairly
excluding many families from the institutional benefits afforded marital
families. Liberal individualism has been able to operate within the
conjugal construct, expanding the liberties of those within it, but not
significantly opening its membership to other groups. Some argue that, as
it did with divorce, conjugality can adjust to accommodate same-sex
couples;201 but compromise here is proving challenging. As those who
would defend marriage did with indissolubility (and then racial purity) in
earlier centuries, many today view the opposite-sex requirement as one of
the essential terms of the conjugal relationship. A relationship that does
not conform to that form is by definition not a conjugal/marital
relationship. Hence, those who would maintain the status quo rely heavily
on natural law and Biblical theories. Individuals who do not meet the
formal pattern (one man, one woman) but seek to formalize their
relationships advance numerous arguments. Among them is the argument
that the principle of liberal individualism permits them to structure their
intimate lives as they see fit and that, by excluding their relationships
(which can perform the same socially useful work as is performed by the
traditional conjugal relationship) from the benefits accorded marriage,
they are made less equal and left with less freedom than is afforded to
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conforming groupings. Giving same-sex couples entry into marriage
would further liberal individual principles.202 To many, however,
eliminating the opposite-sex requirement denatures the institution. They
can perceive no compromise.
Another area where the coexistence of both principles produces
incoherence is the law of parenting, including the doctrine of parental
rights, abuse and neglect laws, and child custody determinations. Rights
“over” children reinforced the conjugal, patriarchal family and were
reflected by family privacy, which empowered a man to control his
household, wife, and children.203 Now gender-neutral, the parental rights
doctrine continues to exist. The doctrine is couched in liberal-individual
and rights-respecting terms, but it clashes with the fundamental tenets of
liberal individualism (which denies that one individual could have rights
over another).204 According to one critic, “[t]he parents are not trustees of
a public good (society’s future citizens), but are owners of the individuals
they have created (their children).”205
Liberal individual protections are now extended to children as well,
and in custody proceedings, the state attempts to exert its parens patriae
power to further children’s best interests. But only to a limited extent.
The coexistence of parents’ rights (Biblical naturalism) and children’s
rights (liberal individualism) leads to undesirable outcomes that disserve
children. It has resulted in child custody rules in which a parent’s
biological connection with a child can trump the child’s stronger
emotional attachment to a non-parent.206 And conjugality, in turn, can
trump both biology and emotional attachment.207 And in cases of
suspected neglect or abuse, institutional practice is even more chaotic. It
is all too easy for the state to justify their “temporary” removal from the
home, because it does not view itself as disrupting the legal right of
parents to their children in these cases. That a “legal” parent-child
relationship continues to exist means nothing to a child, of course.
Temporary removals, in about half of all cases, become long-term
removals. Because many parents fail to respond to state-provided services
202
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and requirements (even when – as is not always the case – those services
are actually offered), children remain in temporary care arrangements,
often developing new attachments. And because it is difficult to meet the
heightened legal standard required in order to terminate parents’ rights to
their children, it is usually years before children receive permanency.208
Together, the laws that express Biblical naturalism and liberal
individualism shape doctrines that affect the lives of millions of
individuals. And together, its foundational principles are wreaking havoc
on the most significant and wide-ranging of our family laws.
CONCLUSION
This Article has proposed a theory of the nature of U.S. family law
that explains our social practices. It draws from the structure of family
law’s rules and practices the content of its key concepts—conjugality,
privacy, contract, and parens patriae. These practices and concepts both
effectuate and make explicit the principles of Biblical naturalism and
liberal individualism.209 These principles underlie our family law and
unify many of our ordinary, unreflective beliefs and practices.210 Now
that those principles have been exposed, we must examine what place in
our public life we wish to give them.211 At a minimum, this Article seeks
to launch a much-needed debate in family law on whether our current
foundational principles are desirable, or even defensible.
More
ambitiously, the Article seeks to ground a much-needed jurisprudence of
family law that better reflects the social goals and needs of contemporary
U.S. society.
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